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COMMON SENSE FOR COMMON STOCK OPTIONS:
INCONSISTENT INTERPRETATION OF ANTI-DILUTION
PROVISIONS IN OPTIONS AND WARRANTS
Miriam R. Albert*
The press is currently full of stories about stock options, ranging from
the changes in accounting treatment being applied to stock options by major
corporations to how to distribute options to the issuer's executives in a
manner most likely to encourage management to maximize shareholder
wealth. 1 Newsworthy as stock options may be at the moment, the drafting of
stock option agreements themselves is not often the subject of detailed
consideration, which can lead to uneven results when the options are the
subject of litigation. Proper drafting of any instrument representing the right
to buy a security, including a derivative instrument such as an option or
warrant, includes planning for any imaginable contingency that may face the
issuer during the life of the instrument. 2 One typical contingency is the
*
Assistant Professor, Legal and Ethical Studies, Fordham University Schools of
Business; LLM, New York University, 1997; ID and MBA, Emory University, 1987; BA,
Tufts University, 1984. The author would like to thank those who provided valuable
assistance: Donna Gitter, Joel Reichart, Joseph Weitzman, and, especially, Dan Berick.
1. A stock option is "an option to buy or sell a specific quantity of stock at a
designated price for a specified period regardless of shifts in market value during the period."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIoNARY 1431 (7th ed. 1999).
A number of major U.S. corporations recently have decided to expense their outstanding
options. See FASB's Plans Regarding the Accounting for Employee Stock Options, July 31,
2001, available at http://www.fasb.org/news/nr073102.shtml (last visited March 4, 2003).
Some pundits even hold the growing use of stock options at least partially responsible for the
now-burst tech stock bubble and for the misleading accounting practices of firms like Enron
and Worldcom. See Gary S. Becker, Options Are Useful-But Only If They're Used Right,
Bus. WK., Aug. 5, 2002, at 26.
2. A warrant is the right to buy some set number of shares for some set price for some
set time period. See WRIIAM MEADE FLETCHER, 19 FLETcmER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §3:44, at 236 (2001). Once the price of the underlying stock rises
above the exercise price for the warrants, the warrants are "in the money" and thus the holders
will benefit financially from their exercise. Warrants are a vehicle to offer investors or
potential investors the possibility of participating in the good fortunes of the issuer, with no
corresponding risk. If the warrants are never in the money, the holders simply never exercise
them.
For most of the analysis herein, there is no practical difference between options and
warrants. Thus, the article uses the term "option" as a generic term to encompass all
agreements representing the right to buy a security. The article uses the specific term when
necessary to further the analysis.
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possibility of a recapitalization of the stock underlying the instrument. A
properly drafted derivative instrument should provide anti-dilution
protection in the event of a recapitalization, in the form of a pro rata
adjustment to the right to acquire shares, so that the recapitalization would
trigger a change to the number of shares that can be acquired upon exercise
3
of the option, with no change to the underlying value of the option itself.
Yet, these instruments are drafted with incomplete or missing anti-dilution
provisions more often than one might imagine. Once the interpretation of the
instrument is under consideration by a court, common sense may be required
to yield to stare decisis.
To illustrate the nature of the problem, suppose the holder of an option
to buy common stock seeks to exercise the option after the issuer has
effected a one-for-five reverse stock split. 4 If no language in the option itself
provides for adjustment in the event of such a change in capitalization, the
3. An example of a typical anti-dilution provision is the language at issue in Reiss v.
FinancialPerformance Corporation,764 N.E.2d 958 (N.Y. 2001), discussed in Parts II and
III infra:
Change in Class of Shares: If, at any time or from time to time, the Corporation, by
stock dividend, stock split, subdivision, reverse split, consolidation, reorganization,
reclassification of shares, or otherwise, changes as a whole its outstanding Common
Stock into a different class of shares, the class of shares into which the Common
Stock has been changed shall replace the Common Stock for purposes of the
Warrants so that the Warrant Holders shall be entitled to receive, and shall receive
upon exercise of the Warrants, shares of the class of stock into which the Common
Stock has been changed.
Warrant Agreement by and between Financial Performance Corp. and Robert S. Trump,
Sept. 1, 1993 (on file with author).
4. In the case of a reverse stock split, several shares are automatically converted into
one share, and the value of the shares would be expected to increase proportionately. For
example, in a one-for-five reverse stock split, each five shares of stock automatically convert
into one share. The holder of the warrant to buy 100 shares of such stock at an exercise price
of $1 per share, with no adjustment language in the warrant, would technically still be entitled
to purchase the same 100 shares stated in the warrant at the same $1 exercise price, but would
get shares worth five times more, representing a five times greater percentage interest in the
issuer than the parties originally contemplated in the warrant. FtrcBER, supra note 2, at
§3:44, at 246.
In a stock split, one share of stock is automatically converted into some number greater
than one, and the value of the shares would be expected to decrease proportionally. For
example, in a two-for-one stock split, each share of stock automatically converts into two
shares. The holder of the warrant to buy 100 shares of such stock at an exercise price of $1 per
share, with no adjustment language in the warrant, would technically still be entitled to
purchase the same 100 shares stated in the warrant at the same $1 exercise price, but would
get shares worth five times less, representing a five times lesser percentage interest in the
issuer than the parties originally contemplated in the warrant. Id.
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option holder will seek to purchase the original number of shares stated in
the option, claiming that was the parties' intent when entering into the
arrangement. The issuer will contend that the parties' intent was that the
number of shares available under the option would automatically adjust
downward by a factor of five, to take into account the reverse stock split. If
the parties seek judicial interpretation of their arrangement, the courts will
balance long-standing common law principles of contract interpretation
against modern-day problems created by imperfect drafting. Stare decisis
mandates that judges follow binding precedents, putting a premium on
consistency, so that similarly-situated litigants are treated similarly.
However, when courts inappropriately or incorrectly apply precedents, the
goal of consistency will not be met.5
Courts bound by the same precedents can arrive at inconsistent results
when adjudicating similar fact patterns, simply by virtue of the approach
they take in applying these precedents and the degree of care and attention
they use in such application. 6 This article is a critique of two competing
theories of contract interpretation, the textual approach, focusing exclusively
on the parties' words, and the contextual approach, focusing on the
circumstances surrounding the contract. Both approaches nominally aim to
ascertain and give effect to the parties' original intent, but the means to this
same end can differ dramatically. Each approach has strong theoretical and
precedential support, and each has merit as an academic theory. 7 An analysis
of cases involving options or warrants drafted with missing or incomplete
anti-dilution provisions illustrates the shortcomings of both theories. In
practice, some courts are applying the principles of contract interpretation in
such an inappropriate or incorrect fashion as to render the principles
virtually meaningless. In all but one of the cases discussed herein, the courts
used principles of contract interpretation to reach results that cannot be
justified under the literal terms of such principles, and that do not further the
underlying purpose of such principles. Instead, the courts used the principles
primarily as a means to achieve some subjective judicial end, with the judge

5.

"Pursuant to stare decisis, doing justice was not the job of the court if precedent

demanded injustice." Joseph M. Perillo, The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract
Formation and Interpretation,69 FORDHAM L. REv. 427, 441 (2000).
6. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An
Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV.

261,301 (1985).
7. Id. at 307.
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giving lip-service to the principles to justify the desired result. 8 The
inconsistent and insupportable results in this area of the law evidence, in a
microcosm, the broader problems with judicial interpretation of contracts in
general.
Part I of this article examines both the textual and contextual approaches
to contract interpretation, analyzing the "plain meaning rule" indicated by
the textual approach and the Restatement principles regarding the omission
of essential contract terms indicated by the contextual approach. Part II is an
analysis of various courts' misapplication of the plain meaning rule and the
Restatement principles in their respective interpretations of option or
warrant agreements that lack, or contain incomplete, anti-dilution provisions.
The Part examines six judicial opinions, in five of which the court supplied
the missing anti-dilution provision by stretching the principles of contract
interpretation beyond the point of reasonableness. The sixth court declined
to supply an adjustment provision, but, in so doing, also misapplied the
principle of contract interpretation it cited. These unsound decisions may
conform to some judicial notion of common sense, but they are not
supportable as a matter of stare decisis under the principles of contract
interpretation relied on therein.
Part III is an analysis of the recent New York Court of Appeals decision
in Reiss v. Financial Performance Corp.,9 in which the court correctly
applied a systematic, contextual approach to contract interpretation. The
court declined to imply an adjustment provision under the Restatement
principles of contract interpretation that require the addition by a court of
missing "essential" terms, and held that the one-for-five reverse stock split
resulted in the warrant holders receiving five times the number of shares
shown on the warrant certificates at issue. 10 Reasonable minds can differ on
the common sense of this result. But it is precedentially sound under present
principles of contract interpretation, and thus is the court's best proxy for the
actual intent of the parties.
Ideally, these principles of contract interpretation would be unnecessary,
as the parties would spell out their agreement in complete and unambiguous
terms. In the real world, however, the application of these principles must be
8. One commentator examined the first twenty cases cited as authorities for the plain
meaning rule by American Jurisprudence2d, and found that while all the cases cited to an
expression of the rule, only two actually followed the rule. See Eyal Zamir, The Inverted
Hierarchyof Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1710, 1731

(1997).
9.

764 N.E.2d 958 (N.Y. 2001).

10. Id.
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applied systematically and correctly to bring about consistent outcomes. The
common law developed principles of contract interpretation as a mechanism
to assist courts in determining, in hindsight, what the parties intended when
they entered into the contract at issue. To the extent that systematic and
correct application of these principles still fails to generate results that
further that goal, the solution is to change, not disregard, the underlying law.
The American judicial system does not change valid and binding legal
11
principles simply because the results may be less than optimal in all cases.
The article concludes that each of the cases analyzed might have been
decided differently, had the judge elected to use a different approach to
contract interpretation or used the chosen approach correctly. The benefits
of a system of stare decisis are compromised by the incorrect application of
precedents. This conclusion threatens the stability of our system of freedom
of contract and illustrates the need to rein in the inconsistency with which
courts interpret all contracts, not just option and warrant agreements. Until
judges apply their chosen approach to contract interpretation consistently
and correctly, contracting parties must take care to articulate their entire
understanding as clearly as possible, to decrease the possibility of subjective
judicial interpretation. Each party will also need to give more thought to the
choice-of-law and choice-of-forum provisions she seeks to govern any
dispute arising under the contract, in the hope that, if litigated, the contract
winds up in front of a judge who will apply the principles of contract
interpretation appropriately and correctly, using the approach that best
serves that party's interest. This contractual forum selection is, in effect, an
end run around stare decisis and an open invitation to forum shopping.
I. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS: FURTHERING THE OBJECTIVE

INTENT OF THE PARTIES OR THE SUBJECTIVE INTENT OF THE JUDICIARY?
The aim of judicial interpretation of contracts is to ascertain and give
effect to what the parties intended when they entered into the contract, a
daunting task. 12 Parties litigating a contract presumably have differing
11. Goetz & Scott, supra note 6, at 272. The imposition of these principles of contract
interpretation is unobjectionable as an academic matter, since parties who do not want their
contract to be interpreted thereunder can simply document their understanding in a manner
foreclosing their applicability. If they fail to do so, the parties must rely on judicial
interpretations of their understanding that can deviate, sometimes dramatically, from their
original intent.
12. "Interpretation of a promise or agreement or a term thereof is the ascertainment of
its meaning." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 200 (1981). See also E. Allan
Farnsworth, Disputes Over Omission In Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 860, 860 (1968);
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opinions as to their collective intent. As litigants, the parties have an
incentive to see their particular version of "the parties' intent" endorsed by
the court. Over time, principles of contract interpretation have developed to
give courts objective tools with which to ascertain the parties' original
intent. Different approaches to the application of these principles have been
proposed by judges and commentators over the last two hundred years. 13
These approaches can be placed along a spectrum ranging from purely
objective in ideal to purely subjective in ideal, with the caveat that neither
endpoint of the spectrum is desirable, or even possible. 14 The debate on the
merits of this spectrum of approaches is both long-standing and well15
documented.
Towards the objective end of the spectrum is a textual approach, holding
the parties' words as sacrosanct and dispositive of their original intent. This
approach is only applicable to contracts in which the parties' language is
clear and unambiguous. In such case, a court can give effect to the parties'
intent by enforcing their words, applying a principle of contract
interpretation known as the "plain meaning" rule. However, if the parties'
words are determined to be ambiguous, the court can consider evidence
extrinsic to the parties' words. Towards the subjective end of the spectrum is
a contextual approach in which the court looks beyond the parties' words,
even absent a finding of ambiguity. The court attempts to ascertain the
parties' intent from the surrounding circumstances through the use of other
principles of contract interpretation.
The approach taken by the court when interpreting a contract can be
outcome-determinative. For example, in the case of a court adjudicating
disputes arising from stock option agreement contracts with incomplete or
missing anti-dilution provisions, if an option issuer effected a one-for-five
reverse stock split, the court interpreting the agreement, if using a textual
Keith A. Rowley, Contract Construction and Interpretation:From the "Four Corners" to
ParolEvidence (and Everything in Between), 69 Miss. L.J. 73, 79-80 (1999).
13. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 6, at 307; Rowley, supra note 12, at 82; Steven W.
Feldman & James A. DeLanis, Resolving ContractualAmbiguity in Tennessee: A Systematic
Approach, 68 TENN. L. REv. 73, 74 (2000).
14. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CAL. L.
REv. 1743, 1748 (2000). A purely objective approach is unrealistic as a practical matter, and a
purely subjective approach would be so capricious as to undermine the very foundations of
stare decisis.
15. Goetz & Scott, supra note 6, at 306-7. See also James P. Nehf, Writing Contracts in
the Client's interest, 51 S.C. L. REV. 153, 170 (1999); Amy H. Kastely, Out of the Whiteness:
On Raced Codes and White Race Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal,and Contract Law,
63 U. CIN. L. REv. 269, 294 (1994).
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approach, would hold the actual unambiguous wording of the contract [i.e.,
the incomplete or missing anti-dilution provision] to be controlling. Thus,
the court would grant the holder a windfall of five times the number of
shares shown on the option, despite the common-sense likelihood that the
parties intended that the corresponding right to buy the underlying securities
would adjust to match changes in the securities themselves, thereby
preserving the grant of value and percentage of ownership given.
If, however, the court interpreting the same agreement were to take a
contextual approach, the court would put the agreement in its factual context
in an effort to determine the parties' original intent. The wording of the
contract would be just one factor in this determination. The court might
conclude from its evaluation of the surrounding circumstances that, although
the parties failed to provide for adjustment in the literal language of the
option, their intent was to provide the holder with the right to buy some
given value of stock, representing some specific equity interest in the issuer,
not five times that much. The court would then read in an adjustment
provision, taking it upon itself to find that the agreed-upon combination of
shares and exercise price should be preserved, even in the absence of
adjustment language in the option itself. Conversely, the court might
conclude from the same circumstances that the parties intentionally omitted
an adjustment term, and, accordingly, grant the holder five times the number
of shares shown on the option.
The degree of care taken by the court is even more critical to the process
of contract interpretation than the decision to apply a textual or contextual
approach. When courts apply their chosen approach to contract
interpretation incorrectly, they make bad law and, even more troubling, they
create bad precedent. The principles of contract interpretation must be
applied correctly and under appropriate triggering circumstances in order to
generate decisions that are legally supportable thereunder.
A. Textualism: When Words Are Deemed Dispositive
To the textualists, the terms of a written contract are paramount to the
determination of the parties' intent. This approach flows from the common
law quest for certainty in the contracting process, which is premised on the
notion that a complete, integrated, written contract is the best reflection of
the parties' intent. The well-settled need for certainty in our contracting
process is evidenced by the parol evidence rule which generally forecloses
the admission of extrinsic evidence to contradict or supplement the terms of
a written contract that is complete on its face, and the Statute of Frauds, with
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its bias towards the written contract. 16 Textualists espouse the continued
entrenchment and exclusivity of doctrines like these. Any evidence of the
parties' intent not memorialized in their written agreement is ignored in an
effort to maintain the objective integrity of the parties' written
understanding. 17 The textual approach presupposes that a court is capable of
determining what constitutes the terms of the agreement in question, and that
the court will be capable of confining its interpretation to such terms, which
may not always be the case. 18 When a court elects to use evidence beyond
the parties' agreement in its interpretation, such interpretation cannot be
justified under a textual approach.
A doctrine that has become virtually synonymous with the textual
approach is the plain meaning rule, which prohibits courts from any
examination of the parties' intent beyond the plain language of their
contract. The rule is a vestige of a formalistic period of contract
interpretation, with its roots in the primitive view that words were symbols
with fixed, objective meanings, and that parties to a writing should be held
to those fixed meanings, regardless of their actual intention in executing the
writing. 19
The rule presents a significant problem in its application, even if
undertaken in a completely consistent fashion. By its terms, the plain
meaning rule operates to exclude extrinsic evidence offered to explain the
parties' intent, absent a finding of ambiguity. 2 0 Thus, only if a court
16. Goetz & Scott, supra note 6, at 273 n.26. See also Farnsworth, supra note 12;
Stephen J. Lubben, Chief Justice Traynor's Contract Jurisprudence and The Free Law
Dilemma: Nazism, The Judiciary, and California's Contract Law, 7 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J.
81,103 (1998).
17. "The textualists have implicitly assumed that the purpose of contract interpretation
is to maintain the reasonable expectations of contracting parties as a class by upholding the
objective integrity of express contractual language." Goetz & Scott, supranote 6, at 308.
18. This presupposition was disproved by the trial court opinion in Reiss v. Financial
Performance Corp. because it relied on filings the defendant made with the Securities and
Exchange Commission, and on warrant agreements by and between the defendant and a third
party unrelated to the litigation. See Reiss v. Fin. Performance Corp., No. 111385-98, slip op.
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 22, 1998) (Ramos, J.) [hereinafter Ramos Sept. Opinion] (on file with
author). See Part II.A. infra for a discussion of this opinion.
19. Karla K. Poe, New Mexico Adopts The Modem Approach to Interpreting
Ambiguities: C.R. Anthony Company v. Loretto Mall Partners, 23 N.M. L. REv. 281, 283
(1993); see also Carlton J. Snow, Contract Interpretation:The Plain Meaning Rule in Labor
Arbitration, 55 FoRDHAm L. REv. 681, 684 (1987).
20. Lohnes v. Level 3 Communications, Inc., 272 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2001).
A court's determination that a contract is or is not ambiguous has important
implications. If a court holds that a contract is unambiguously worded, it typically
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determined that a contract term was ambiguous could it go beyond the
parties' words and consider other evidence. 2 1 The rigidity of the rule creates
the possibility of an inconsistency, as it bars a court from using extrinsic
evidence to determine the parties' intent, even though some extrinsic
evidence might be relevant to this inquiry. 22 Ironically, under the plain
meaning rule, such extrinsic evidence is barred unless and until the court
23
finds an ambiguity.
Since the plain meaning rule limits the evidence that can be considered,
it has the advantages of simplicity, uniformity and predictability. 2 4 But the
will construe the document based upon the plain and natural meaning of the language
contained therein. For the most part, a court interpreting an unambiguous agreement
need not consult extrinsic evidence to impart the meaning of its terms. A court may,
however, consider extrinsic evidence for the limited purpose of evaluating whether a
term is ambiguous in the first place, but only if the extrinsic evidence suggests a
meaning to which the challenged language is reasonably susceptible.
Id. (internal citations omitted). See Snow, supra note 19, at 681-82.
21. If, however, ambiguity looms-that is, if 'the plain meaning of a contract phrase
does not spring unambiguously from the page or from the context'--then the
interpretive function involves a question of fact. In such cases, a court may consider
extrinsic evidence insofar as it sheds light on what the parties intended.
Lohnes, 272 F.3d at 53-54 (citations omitted).
22. Margaret N. Kniffin, A New Trend in Contract Interpretation: The Search for
Reality as Opposed to Virtual Reality, 74 OR. L. REv. 643, 648 (1995).
Although courts regularly cite both propositions of the PMR [plain meaning rule]namely, that when the language is plain there is no room for interpretation, and that
in such cases there is no room for considering external facts--the two are somewhat
inconsistent, and the first one is intrinsically problematic. They are inconsistent
because the second proposition, that unambiguous text should be interpreted without
reference to external facts, assumes--contrary to the first proposition--that there is
room for interpretation. The first proposition is untenable if interpretation is taken to
be the determination of the meaning of a text. One cannot tell whether a text has a
plain meaning without knowing what that meaning is, which requires an act of
interpretation.
Zamir, supra note 8, at 1728-29 (emphasis in original).
23. Snow, supra note 19, at 685.
Writings on law and language amply demonstrate that a theoretical weakness inherent
in the rule is its assumption that words are capable of having unambiguous meaning.
Application of the plain meaning rule requires the preliminary step of characterizing
contractual language as either plain or unambiguous. Because the rule does not give
courts guidance on how to make this determination, decision-makers are left with the
difficult task of determining, as a matter of law, whether a written agreement is clear
or ambiguous.
Id.
24. Poe, supra note 19, at 285-86.
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underlying premise of the plain meaning rule, that words are capable of clear
and unambiguous meaning, is questionable. In a perfect world, words in a
contract would have one meaning only, and all the parties to the contract
would acknowledge this exclusive meaning. The plain meaning rule would
work beautifully in that particular and unlikely scenario. But the benefits of
the plain meaning rule diminish when the parties' words are not so crystal
clear. 25
As a result of the plain meaning rule's rigid reliance on the unattainable
goal of complete objectivity based on the parties' words, courts may wind up
imposing their own understanding of the meaning of the text and may
substitute their own experience for that of the parties. Although the rule was
designed to give effect to the parties' intent, in practice, it subordinates their
intentions to the intrinsic meaning of their chosen words as determined by a
court. 26 Thus, the court may enforce a different contract than the one the
27
parties actually intended.
The plain meaning rule is increasingly disfavored, but reports of its
death have been greatly exaggerated, given that a majority of the
jurisdictions in the United States still adhere, at least nominally, to the
rule. 2 8 A detailed criticism and wake for the plain meaning rule is beyond
the scope of this article. More relevant for our purposes is that this rule, with
its attendant problems, was the nominal basis for the result reached by the
25. As Justice Holmes famously said, a "word is not a crystal, transparent and
unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content
according to circumstances and the time in which it is used." Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418,
425 (1918).
According to Judge Learned Hand, "Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they
have only a communal existence; and not only does the meaning of each interpenetrate the
other, but all in their aggregate take their purport from the setting in which they are used ......
NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941).
26. See Perillo, supra note 5, at 431.
27. See Poe, supra note 19, at 285.

When their own communication errors cause the parties to understand their
agreement in diverse ways, the state's subsequent defining of the disputed terms will
necessarily conflict with at least one party's intent. In addition to such errors
precipitated by the parties themselves, the state may in effect superimpose new and
thus "erroneous" instructions on an original formulation that was well understood
between the parties but disputed for strategic motives. Such errors will occur when
the court either enforces terms that were almost certainly not contemplated by either
party or refuses to enforce terms that were.
Goetz & Scott, supra note 6, at 271.
28. Kniffin, supra note 22, at 648; Poe, supra note 19, at 283; see also Zamir, supra
note 8, at 1731.
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trial courts in Reiss v. FinancialPerformance Corporationand in Sanders v.
Wang, both unsound decisions. Had these courts correctly applied their
chosen textual approach to contract interpretation, the parties' intent might
29
have been served.
B. Contextualism: When CircumstancesAre Deemed Controlling
Over time, the textual approach to contract interpretation has lost favor,
as judges and commentators began to seek more fluid and less mechanical
approaches to contract interpretation. 3 0 One such approach is a contextual
approach, under which relevant contextual evidence is paramount to the
determination of the parties' intent. 3 1 Contextualists view the textual
approach of limiting the court's analysis to the parties' literal words as a
disservice to the parties and a slavish adherence to obsolete doctrines that
impedes the court's work. 3 2 Instead, in a contextual analysis, extrinsic
evidence relating to a contract is admissible to aid the court in determining
whether an ambiguity exists. Some contextualist courts have gone further,
33
removing virtually all restraints on the admission of extrinsic evidence.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts has contributed to this shift
away from a dogmatic and intransigent textual approach. The Restatement
29. See infra Part II. for a discussion of these cases.
30. Zamir, supra note 8, at 1713. According to one set of commentators, the battle is
over and the contextualists have won, since the Uniform Commercial Code and the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts have "abandoned the plain-meaning rule and eviscerated
the parol evidence rule" to permit certain extrinsic evidence even if the express terms of the
contract are clear. Goetz & Scott, supra note 6, at 307.
31. See Snow, supra note 19, at 684.
The new trend is an outgrowth of an earlier but continuing trend in which an
increasing number of courts have rejected the plain meaning rule and have
acknowledged that extrinsic evidence relating to context should always be admissible
to determine whether an ambiguity exists. In so doing, these courts hold that it is not
possible to know whether there are two or more reasonable interpretations of a
disputed contract term without examining the surrounding circumstances.
Kniffin, supra note 22, at 643.
"Generally, courts agree that ambiguity in a contractual provision is not established
merely because the contracting parties disagree about the meaning of a provision. The
prevailing view is that courts should consider objective rather than subjective manifestations
of contractual intent." Snow, supra note 19, at 686.
"mhe contextualists have assumed that the purpose of interpretation is to uphold the
expectations of the particular parties to the agreement by determining from an analysis of all
relevant evidence what they 'really meant."' Goetz & Scott, supra note 6, at 308.
32. Id. at 306-07.
33. See Kniffin, supra note 22, at 644; see also Poe, supra note 19, at 287.
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provisions on contract interpretation are not dependent on a judicial finding
of ambiguity, but rather "are used in determining what meanings are
34
reasonably possible as well as in choosing among possible meanings."
Under the Restatement, the plain meaning rule has been modified by the
caveat "unless a different intention is manifested," moving its approach from
textual to contextual with just six words. 3 5 When the parties have reduced
their agreement to writing, "interpretation is directed to the meaning of that
writing in light of the circumstances." 36 Toward that end, a court may
supply a contract term not agreed to by the parties. 37 This otherwise open
invitation for a court to impose its views on the parties is tempered by the
caveat that such an omitted term must be "essential" to a determination of
the parties' rights and duties. The addition of this "omitted" term does not
constitute interpretation under the Restatement, thus it cannot be added
38
simply to give effect to the parties' intent.
Under the Restatement, the judicially-supplied term must be "reasonable
in the circumstances."' 39 The Restatement details the circumstances under
which parties might omit an "essential" term. The first circumstance is when
the parties fail to foresee the contingency triggering the dispute. The parties
would therefore have no expectations with respect to such contingency, so
there would be no point in a court trying to determine what those
expectations would have been. 40 The court should then read in the term that
the parties would have drafted had the contingency been brought to their
attention, which is easier said than done. 41
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 cmt. a (1981).
35. Id. § 202(3)(a); see RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 235 (1932).
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 cmt. b.
37. Id. §204.
38. Id. at §204 cmt. c.
Where there is tacit agreement or a common tacit assumption or where a term can be
supplied by logical deduction from agreed terms and the circumstances,
interpretation may be enough. But interpretation may result in the conclusion that
there was in fact no agreement on a particular point, and that conclusion should be
accepted even though the omitted term could be supplied by giving agreed language
a meaning different from the meaning or meanings given to it by the parties.
.1d.
39. Id. § 204.
40. ld. § 204 cmt. b.
41. "The perceived merit of this approach is that it comes closest to what the parties
have actually agreed to, and after all, enforcing the agreement of the parties is what contract
law is all about." Dennis Patterson, The Pseudo-DebateOver Default Rules in Contract Law,
3 S. CAL INTERDISC. L.J. 236, 237 (1993). According to the Restatement:
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The second circumstance under which parties might omit an "essential"
term is when the parties have expectations with respect to the contingency
that they failed to manifest in their written understanding. 4 2 Possible reasons
include the expectation resting on an unconscious or partially conscious
assumption, the situation seeming unimportant or unlikely, or when a
discussion of the contingency might be unpleasant, dilatory, or might result
in an impasse in negotiations. 4 3 Unfortunately, the Restatement finds no
qualitative difference between parties with an expectation about a
contingency and parties without such an expectation, allowing courts in
either event to supply their own "reasonable" terms, as long as the court
determines the omitted term is "essential." And the Restatement misses an
opportunity to bring clarity to the rule on adding omitted terms by giving no
guidance as to what makes a term essential. 4 4 Ironically, the courts are left
to apply the plain meaning of the word.
11. JUDICIAL MISINTERPRETATION OF INCOMPLETE OR MISSING ANTIDILUTION PROVISIONS

The six judicial opinions interpreting common stock options or warrant
agreements that omit, or contain incomplete, anti-dilution provisions each
misapply the plain meaning rule or the Restatement rules, with two of the
courts in fact misapplying both rules in their opinions.
A. JudicialMisapplicationof the Plain Meaning Rule
The plain meaning rule presents theoretical and doctrinal problems, as
discussed above, even if applied in a consistent and correct manner. 4 5 When
The process of supplying an omitted term has sometimes been disguised as a literal or
a purposive reading of contract language directed to a situation other than the
situation that arises. Sometimes it is said that the search is for the term the parties
would have agreed to if the question had been brought to their attention. Both the
meaning of the words used and the probability that a particular term would have been
used if the question had been raised may be factors in determining what term is
reasonable in the circumstances. But where there is in fact no agreement, the court
should supply a term which comports with community standards of fairness and
policy rather than analyze a hypothetical model of the bargaining process.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAS § 204 cmt. d.
42. Id. § 204 cmt. b.
43. Id.
44. Patterson, supra note 41, at 247.
45. See supra Part I. for a discussion of the problems inherent in the plain meaning rule.
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it is incorrectly applied, the practical results can be even more problematic.
A recent judicial opinion interpreting an agreement granting warrants to buy
common stock with no anti-dilution provision illustrates the dangers of an
incorrect judicial application of the plain meaning rule. In Reiss v. Financial
Performance Corp., the trial court nominally relied on the plain meaning
rule, but was unable to limit the scope of its interpretation to the actual text
of the parties' contract. 4 6 Relying on evidence extrinsic to the text, the trial
court gave effect to its view of what the parties should have intended, rather
than the intention of the parties that was evidenced by the actual language of
the agreement.
Marvin Reiss, a director and shareholder of Financial Performance
Corporation ("Financial"), 4 7 sought to exercise two warrants to purchase
Financial common stock after Financial effected a one-for-five reverse stock
split. 4 8 One of the warrants was issued to Mr. Reiss personally (the "Reiss
Warrant") 4 9 and the other to Rebot Corporation, a corporation whollyowned by Mr. Reiss (the "Rebot Warrant"). 50 The certificates evidencing
46. See Ramos Sept. Opinion, supra note 18.
47. Financial was incorporated in New York in 1984. See Financial Performance
CorporationAnnual Report of Form 1O-KSBforfiscal year ended Sept. 30, 1996, at 4 (on file
with author) [hereinafter 1996 10-KSB]. Financial changed its name to BrandPartners Group
Inc. and its state of incorporation to Delaware, effective August 20, 2001. See Verified
Amended Complaint, Jan. 7, 2002, Index No. 11.1385/98, at 2 (on file with author)
[hereinafter Verified Amended Complaint]. Financial consummated an initial public offering
of its common stock in January 1987. See 1996 10-KSB, supra, at 1. The common stock began
trading on the Nasdaq over-the-counter market in 1987 and was de-listed in July 1989
because Financial failed to maintain Nasdaq's minimum capital requirements. Id. In February
1990, Financial ceased its day-to-day operations and remained inactive through November
1992. Id. Financial resumed operations in January 1993, and its common stock resumed
trading on the OTC Bulletin Board on November 27, 1996. Id.
48. Financial's shareholders approved a one-for-five reverse stock split at the annual
meeting on August 26, 1996; as a result, the shareholders each owned one-fifth the number of
shares they owned before the split, but maintained their percentage equity ownership interest.
See 1996 1O-KSB, supra note 47, at F-12. The proxy statement covering the proposed reverse
stock split did not mention any adjustment to outstanding warrants. See Verified Amended
Complaint, supra note 47, at 3.
49. On November 11, 1993, Financial's board authorized the issuance of the Reiss
Warrant for 500,000 shares at a price of 10 cents per share, issued as an honorarium in
recognition of Reiss' services on Financial's board. Mr. Reiss had served as a director of
Financial since December 12, 1984, and as treasurer since January 19, 1993. See Financial
Performance Group Annual Report on Form 10-KSB forfiscal year ended Sept. 30, 1993, at
19 (on file with author) [hereinafter 1993 1O-KSB]. The warrant expired on August 31, 1998.
Id. at 15.
50. Mr. Reiss made numerous loans to Financial from 1989 through 1993, including a
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the Reiss and Rebot Warrants were physically delivered to Mr. Reiss some
two years after Financial's board of directors had authorized them.5 1 The
warrant certificates did not provide for adjustment in the number of shares
or in the warrant exercise price under any circumstances, including in the
event of a reverse stock split.5 2 Although warrant certificates typically are
issued pursuant to warrant agreements, warrant purchase agreements, or
other similar contracts that spell out additional terms and conditions
governing the warrant, no such corresponding agreements were ever entered
into in connection with the Reiss or Rebot Warrants, either
53
contemporaneous with or subsequent to their issuance.
A few weeks before Financial issued the Reiss and Rebot Warrants, it
issued several other warrants, including one to Robert S. Trump, a director
and shareholder. 54 A corresponding warrant agreement was executed
contemporaneously with the issuance of Mr. Trump's warrant, containing a

loan in the amount of $187,328.79. See Ramos Sept. Opinion, supra note 18, at 1. Financial's
inability to repay this loan led to the issuance on October 8, 1993 of the Rebot Warrant for
1,198,904 shares of Financial's common stock at a price of 10 cents per share. The warrant
expired on September 30, 1998. Id.
51. ld; see also Transmittal Letters of Gary S. Friedman, Esq. to Reiss and Rebot
Corp., Nov. 21, 1995, delivering the Reiss and Rebot Warrants, at 44-45 (on file with author)
[hereinafter Record on Appeal].
52. Under New York law:
The terms and conditions of such rights or options, including the time or times at or
within which and the price or prices at which they may be exercised and any
limitations upon transferability, shall be set forth or incorporated by reference in the
instrument or instruments evidencing such rights or options.
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 505(c) (consol. 2002).
53. The letters enclosing the Reiss and Rebot Warrants claimed such warrants were each
"subject to the terms and conditions of a warrant agreement dated even date therewith on file
at the Company's offices." Record on Appeal, supra note 51, at 83. The letters requested that
the warrant holders sign and return a copy of such letters to indicate their acknowledgement
and agreement. Id. Mr. Reiss never did so personally or on behalf of Rebot. Id. Instead, Mr.
Reiss' counsel sent a letter dated Oct. 9, 1997, asking if there were "any documents in any
way impacting upon or adversely affecting the number of warrants and/or the number of
shares which can be purchased upon exercise of said warrants." Id.
Financial's counsel responded by letter dated Oct. 21, 1997 that Financial's records
reflected the number of shares available under the Reiss and Rebot Warrants as adjusted by a
factor of five due to the reverse stock split. Id. at 84.
Finally, by letter dated May 6, 1998, Financial's counsel furnished Reiss' counsel with
the warrant agreements it claimed controlled the Reiss and Rebot Warrants. Id. at 87.
54. See 1993 1O-KSB, supra note 49, at 32.
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provision requiring adjustment in the event of any recapitalization (including
55
a stock split) involving Financial's common stock.
In April 1998, Mr. Reiss, personally and on behalf of Rebot, sought to
partially exercise the Reiss and Rebot Warrants, and asserted that he was
entitled to the number of shares specified in the warrants, without any
adjustment for the reverse stock split. 56 Financial rejected the purported
exercise, claiming the number of shares available under both warrants had
been adjusted downward by a factor of five as a result of the reverse stock
split. 57 Mr. Reiss filed suit, seeking a judgment declaring his right to
purchase the face amount of the warrants at the exercise price. 5 8
The trial court dismissed the action in September 1998, and the court's
nominally textual approach generated conclusions that are wholly
insupportable, both under the theory by which it analyzed the case and in
fact.5 9 It found the specific written terms of the Reiss and Rebot Warrants

55. Id. The Trump Warrant Agreement contained a comprehensive anti-dilution section
and was signed by both parties. The warrant agreement Financial sought during the litigation
to introduce as binding on the Reiss and Rebot Warrants is signed only by Financial, with no
signature line for the warrant holders. See Warrant Agreement between Financial
Performance Corp. and Robert S. Trump, supra note 3.
56. See Verified Amended Complaint, supra note 47, at 3; see also Record on Appeal,
supra note 51, at 44-45.
57. Financial documented the reverse split and the corresponding change in the number
of shares of issued and outstanding common stock in its books and records and its filings with
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). In its Annual Report on Form 10-K for
1996, under Item 11: Security Ownership of Certain Beneficial Owners and Management,
Financial tacitly indicated its position that all of the outstanding warrants were subject to
adjustment by listing Rebot in Financial's books and records as entitled to purchase 239,781
shares of stock (one fifth of the original 1,198,904) and Reiss as entitled to purchase 100,000
shares of stock (one fifth of the original 500,000). See 1996 1O-KSB, supra note 47, at 24.
Financial also noted a change in the exercise price of each share of stock to reflect the reverse
stock split, with each share now exercisable at 50 cents instead of 10 cents. Id.
On May 6, 1998, Financial wrote to Reiss' counsel: "As you and your clients have
previously been advised, the September 1993 and November 1993 warrants were issued by
the Company subject to the terms and conditions of warrant agreements dated even date
therewith on file at the Company's offices, which is customary corporate practice." Id. at 38.
Yet no warrant agreement was produced to support this position.
58. References to Mr. Reiss as a litigant in this matter are deemed to include him in his
personal capacity and as the sole shareholder of Rebot. Mr. Reiss also sought judgment
reforming the warrants to provide for extended exercise periods stemming from Financial's
delay in physically delivering the warrants, and staying the expiration date while the action
was pending. See Ramos Sept. Opinion, supra note 18, at 2.
59. Id. at 4.
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required a proportional adjustment due to the reverse stock split. 60 The trial
court further found the Reiss and Rebot Warrants to be unambiguous by
their terms, and justified its finding by stating that "there is no basis in law
or fact upon which a court may grant declaratory relief which would permit
plaintiffs to exercise the warrants without adjusting for the reverse stock
split put into effect by the defendants." 6 1 This finding is groundless, since
the only documents evidencing the agreement of the parties were the Reiss
and Rebot Warrants, which contain no adjustment provisions. 62 The trial
court extended its textual analysis to provisions not within the actual text of
the warrant certificates, including the warrant agreements between Financial
and Mr. Trump, a letter from Financial to Mr. Reiss and certain filings
Financial made with the Securities and Exchange Commission ( "SEC") that
noted Financial's view that the Reiss and Rebot Warrants had adjusted by
virtue of the reverse stock split. 6 3 The trial court seemed to think that an
SEC filing could somehow modify the otherwise complete contractual
arrangement between Financial and Mr. Reiss concerning the warrants. 64 A
unilateral assertion in a letter or filing cannot, ipso facto, bind the
recipient. 6 5 If sending a party a letter purportedly binding her to some
60. According to the court, "at the time of issuance, by their written terms the warrants
at issue permit and require appropriate adjustments in number and price in the event of a duly
authorized reverse split." Id. at 3.
61. Id. at 4.
62. No anti-dilution protection is "automatically part of a stock purchase warrant
contract. Rather, the precise antidilution protection afforded to a warrant holder will depend
on the express terms of the contract itself." Anderson v. Somatogen, Inc., 940 P.2d 1079,
1082 (Colo. 1996) (internal citations omitted).
63. Ramos Sept. Opinion,supra note 18, at 3.
64. "Plaintiff Reiss was a director of the defendant at the time that the warrants were
authorized for issuance and cannot assert that he was unaware of the precise terms and
conditions of the same, inasmuch as his signature appears on an official document filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission, which contain the relevant terms and conditions of
the warrants." Id. at 3.
Even if that were true, in this case, the filing the trial court refers to is Financial's Form
10-KSB for 1996, to which Mr. Reiss is not a signatory. See 1996 1O-KSB, supra note 47, at
36. Mr. Reiss did sign the 1993 10-KSB that was filed before the reverse stock split, and
which showed the number of warrants available as the original number on the certificate. See
1993 1O-KSB, supra note 49, at 23-24.
65. Financial's transmittal letter, dated November 21, 1995, claimed that the Reiss and
Rebot Warrants were "subject to the terms and conditions of a warrant agreement dated even
date therewith on file at the Company's offices located at 335 Madison Avenue, New York,
New York 10017." Reiss v. Fin. Performance Corp., 715 N.Y.S.2d 29, 37 (N.Y. App. Div.
2000) (Saxe, J., dissenting in part). The transmittal letter requested that Reiss sign the bottom
to acknowledge receipt. Id. (Saxe, J.,dissenting in part). Reiss did not sign or return the

RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 34:321

condition, or making that same statement in a filing with the SEC could
actually make the condition binding, freedom of contract would be displaced
by a race to the mailbox or to the filing desk at the SEC. 66 The heart of a
binding contract is the mutual assent of the parties, not the unilateral
imposition of a term ex post facto. And the policy underlying the textual
approach to contract interpretation is to use only the clear, unambiguous
words of the parties to give effect to their intent. This court undercut this
policy with its insupportable rationale.
The trial court affirmed its prior decision in December 1998, finding that
Mr. Reiss "relies on the fact that the terms are not contained in the warrants
themselves." 67 This is absolutely true, completely appropriate and outcometransmittal letter. Id. (Saxe, J.,
dissenting in part). There is nothing in the record that could be
the referenced "warrant agreement of even date." Id. (Saxe, J., dissenting in part). Even if
Financial could produce the referenced "warrant agreement of even date," such agreement
could not be unilaterally imposed on Reiss personally or on behalf of Rebot. Id. (Saxe, J.,
dissenting in part).
66. Nor does the Corporation's assertion, in its 1996 report filed with the SEC,
informing its
shareholders and/or prospective shareholders that plaintiffs' warrants were subject to
the reverse one-to-five stock split, make that assertion accurate. Indeed, the evidence
submitted compels the conclusion that the statement contained in the Corporation's
1996 Form 10-KSB simply lacked any foundation in fact.
Id. at 40 (Saxe, J., dissenting in part).
67. See Reiss v. Fin. Performance Corp., No. 111385-98, slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec.
18, 1998) (Ramos, J.)[hereinafter Ramos Dec. Opinion] (on file with author).
The trial court also denied Reiss' request for reformation due to the delay, again an
insupportable finding. Id. The ruling was issued on September 22, 1998, after the expiration
date of the Reiss Warrant on August 31, 1998, and days before the expiration of the Rebot
Warrant on September 30, 1998. Id. Certainly the delay in delivery of the actual warrant
certificates should not, in and of itself, result in equitable reformation of the expiration period
unless Reiss could show that he was unaware of the existence of the warrants until their
delivery, and thereby incapable of exercising them prior thereto. That the warrant certificates
were not physically delivered to Mr. Reiss until November 21, 1995 is of no substance, as Mr.
Reiss knew or should have known of the existence of the warrants and thus could have
exercised them. The Rebot Warrant was issued in repayment of a debt owed to a corporation
he wholly owned; Mr. Reiss or his designated agent presumably participated in the
negotiations leading up to the issuance of the warrant. Alternatively, Mr. Reiss would have
learned of the existence of the Reiss and Rebot Warrants from the board's authorization
thereof, since Mr. Reiss was a director at the time the warrants were authorized. Further,
Financial listed the warrants on its books and records and in its SEC filings, including its
1993 Annual Report on Form 10-KSB. See 1993 1O-KSB, supra note 49. Mr. Reiss had a
fiduciary duty to be familiar with the contents of these filings, again because of his status as
director and treasurer. For example, he signed the 1993 10-KSB. See 1993 1O-KSB, supra
note 49, at 34.
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determinative. 6 8 The trial court claims that its failure to "enumerate the
exact location of the expression of those terms is irrelevant."'6 9 In fact, such
The issue of whether Mr. Reiss should have known of the existence of the warrants turns
out to be a non-issue, and the record clearly indicates he had actual knowledge of same. Reiss,
715 N.Y.S.2d at 38 (Saxe, J., dissenting in part). Mr. Reiss' actual knowledge of the existence
of the Reiss and Rebot Warrants is demonstrated by his counsel's correspondence with
Financial's president, seeking to confirm the Reiss and Rebot Warrants remained in their
initial issuance amounts, and requesting "any documents in any way impacting upon or
adversely affecting the number of warrants and/or the number of shares which can be
purchased upon the exercise of said warrants." Id. (Saxe, J., dissenting in part). While this
would have been an appropriate time for Financial to send the warrant agreements that it
claimed governed the transaction, Financial responded only that the numbers had been
reduced to conform to the reverse split, with no warrant agreements produced in support
thereof. Id. (Saxe, J., dissenting in part).
Regardless, the lengthy litigation should result in a reformation stemming from
Financial's improper refusal to accept Reiss' valid exercise; the clock should have stopped
then, pending resolution of the litigation. By the time the case reached the Court of Appeals,
the warrant period, even if extended by the two years Reiss requested at trial, would have long
expired. Thus any interpretation of the warrants by the Court of Appeals (or the Supreme
Court on remand) would be a purely academic exercise without a remedy that includes
reforming the exercise period beyond the conclusion of the litigation.
The lengthy litigation also raises issues in the calculation of damages. Reiss calculates
the damages highest intermediate value of a share of Financial and its successor-in-interest,
BrandPartners Group, Inc. on the over-the-counter market, which was $17.00 per share on
February 24, 2000. See Verified Amended Complaint, supra note 47, at 4-5. Thus, the total
damages would be $17.00 multiplied by 500,000 (that being the number of shares available
for purchase under the Reiss Warrant), less the exercise price of 10 cents per share, totaling
8.45 million. Id. Likewise, for the Rebot Warrant, the damages total 1,198,904 shares at
$17.00 each, less 10 cents per share for the exercise price, for a total of over $20 million. Id.
68. The defendants' position is that it is "axiomatic" that:
a stock warrant necessarily converts in exactly the same manner as existing common
stock converts upon any sort of adjustment to the form of the stock. However, this is
an unfounded assumption. Indeed, the very reason for the standard issuance of
warrant agreements simultaneously with stock warrants is to define (and limit) the
parties' rights under the warrants. If stock warrants were deemed automatically
adjusted upon consolidations or reclassifications of corporate stock, so that they
-maintained their proportionate value, there would be no need for the use of warrant
agreements to establish the concept of proportional adjustment of stock warrants.
dissenting in part).
Reiss, 715 N.Y.S. 2d at 40 (Saxe, J.,
69. See Ramos Dec. Opinion, supra note 67, at 1. Yet the court found:
the terms that provide for adjustment in the case of a reverse stock split are contained
[sic] SEC filings and the letters which accompanied the issuance of the warrants at
issue. Those letters state that the warrants at issue were subject to the adjustment
requirement. Thus the adjustment requirement is a term of each warrant.
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failure is not only relevant, it is dispositive under the textual approach on
which the trial court based its finding.
If the trial court had applied correctly its chosen textual approach to
interpreting the warrants, Mr. Reiss would have prevailed. Since there were
no warrant agreements executed by the parties in connection with the Reiss
or Rebot Warrants, the unambiguous warrant certificates themselves
represent the only written agreement of these parties and thus the entire
legally binding expression of their understanding-which did not provide for
adjustment in the event of a reverse stock split. Under a textual analysis, the
words of the warrants should have been given their plain and usual meaning,
and Mr. Reiss would thus be entitled to the actual number of shares provided
in the warrants, with no adjustment. The trial court's inclusion of text
beyond the agreement of the parties is not supportable under a textual
approach.
B. JudicialMisapplicationof the Restatement Principlesof Contract
Interpretation
The Restatement rules on contract interpretation permit courts to apply a
contextual approach to contract analysis, thereby arriving at consistent
results. For example, the Restatement rule on omitted terms permits courts to
supply terms that are "essential" to a determination of the parties' intent.
Because the Restatement fails to clarify what is meant by "essential,' courts
have been able to use this rule to support decisions to add terms they felt the
parties should have included, regardless of the parties' intent. This judicial
overstepping is illustrated in the New York Appellate Division's decision in
Reiss. The decision nominally relies on the Restatement rule for adding
"essential" omitted terms, but the court imposes its judgment of the
significance of the missing term to give effect to what it thinks the parties
should have intended, rather than what the parties actually did intend.
The appellate division used a contextual approach not only to reject the
lower court's reasoning, but also ultimately to affirm its conclusion. 70 The
court reasoned that "in the absence of any evidence that the parties to a
warrant contemplated otherwise, the warrant holder, because of the reverse
70. "We note at the outset that, contrary to the conclusion reached by the Supreme
Court, the warrants at issue failed to contain any contractual language dealing with the
eventuality of a reverse stock split.... Nevertheless... we agree that plaintiffs' complaint
should be dismissed." Reiss, 715 N.Y.S. 2d at 32. The court found that the lower court
considered the Trump warrants, which were not at issue here, just like the possibility of a
stock split is not at issue here. Id.
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stock split, is limited to purchasing shares proportionally adjusted as to both
number and price." 7 1 The basis for its opinion is purportedly the
Restatement approach, permitting a court to supply a term that is reasonable
under the circumstances if it is "essential to a determination of the rights and
duties of the parties." 7 2 The court determined that since an adjustment
provision would fundamentally affect both the number of shares available
under the warrant and the exercise price, such a provision constituted an
essential term.
However, a comment to the Restatement section relied on by the court
undermines its reasoning. Under the Restatement, the supplying of an
omitted term does not constitute interpretation. 7 3 Since the Restatement
defines interpretation as the ascertainment of a contract's meaning, it
follows that an omitted term cannot be added simply to give effect to the
judge's determination of the parties' intent. Instead, an essential term under
the Restatement rule is one that is necessary to effectuate the contract. Thus,
the adjustment term added by the court is not an omitted essential term under
the Restatement because the Reiss and Rebot Warrants could be enforced
solely based on their terms. That literal enforcement of the warrant terms
would result in the warrant holders' entitlement to the actual number of
74
shares listed therein.
The appellate division declined to "disregard common sense and
slavishly bow to the written word where to do so would plainly ignore the
true intentions of the parties in the making of a contract." '75 This
condemnation of the textual approach is in keeping with the current judicial
trend towards contextualism. The court follows the trend, seeking "the
essence of proper contract interpretation, which, of course, is to enforce a
contract in accordance with the true expectations of the parties in light of the
circumstances existing at the time of the formation of the contract. ' 7 6 Yet
the contextual approach using the Restatement rule on essential omitted
terms should not be a blank check for a court to impose its view on the
parties. 77 Despite the complete lack of any evidence indicating that the
71. Id. at 30.
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (1981).
73. Id. § 204 cmt. c; see supra note 37 and accompanying text.
74. "These terms-amount, price, and time frame-constitute the essential elements of
the agreement. The term the majority believes to have been accidentally omitted amounts to
dissenting in
merely a possible condition or limitation." Reiss, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 40 (Saxe, J.,
part).
75. Id. at 34.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 40 (Saxe, J., dissenting in part).
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parties intended automatic adjustment in the event of any recapitalization,
the court, in its effort to disregard what it considers common sense, held that
an adjustment provision should have been, and thus somehow must have
78
been, the parties' intent.
The court uses the rhetoric of the Restatement to reach its desired result,
the adding of an adjustment provision, which it somehow determined to be
the only reasonable term consistent with what it found to be the "selfevident" expectations of the parties when the warrants were executed. 79 Yet
the parties' expectations are far from self-evident, and the record contains no
basis for determining such expectation. 80 The only support for the court's
determination of the parties "true expectation" results from its question to
Mr. Reiss about his hypothetical response in the event that Financial had
undertaken a stock split instead of a reverse stock split. Mr. Reiss conceded
that he would have asserted a contrary position, which is his right. 8 1 Even
though the court acknowledges that Mr. Reiss' position on the hypothetical
circumstance of a stock split (as opposed to the reverse stock split actually at
issue), is "certainly not dispositive," the court nonetheless uses this inquiry

However, resort by a court to its subjective view of common sense is not a proper
basis for a legal conclusion, particularly when it ignores both plaintiff's assertion of
what the parties negotiated and intended, as well as '[t]he cardinal rule of contract
interpretation... that, where the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous,
the parties' intent is to be gleaned from the language of the agreement and whatever
may be reasonably implied therefrom.'
Id.
78. "In view of the definitive language of the contract, grafting limitations or conditions
onto these warrants amounts to rewriting the contracts, and may not be justified as the
application of logic or common sense." Id. at 41 (Saxe, J., dissenting in part) (citations
omitted).
The majority's insertion of a limitation cannot be accurately characterized as a simple
construction of the document's terms. Rather, the majority is actually altering a basic,
definite term of the contract, as to the price at which plaintiffs were entitled to
purchase stock of the corporation. However, the rules of contract construction do not
permit an alteration of a clear contract term, based upon a change in circumstances
not provided for by the parties at the time of the contract.
Id. (Saxe, J., dissenting in part).
79. Id. at 34.
80. The court ignores the extrinsic evidence submitted by Reiss in its determination of
the parties' intent, including assertions by Mr. Reiss in an affidavit, elaborated on in his
supporting brief, articulating his refusal "to accept the warrants if they were made subject to a
warrant agreement which provided for a proportionatechange of entitlement in the event of a
reverse stock split." Id. at 42 (Saxe, J., dissenting in part) (emphasis in original).
81. Id. at n.4.
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as the centerpiece of its determination of the parties' "true expectation." 8 2
There is no legal reason Mr. Reiss should be required to advance the same
argument in the event of a stock split that he would advance in the case of a
reverse stock split, especially as the circumstances being litigated involved a
reverse stock split and not a stock split. It is as inappropriate for a court to
decide a matter focusing on the legal position the parties might have taken
had some other situation occurred, as it was for the trial court to consider the
warrants issued to Mr. Trump by Financial in interpreting the Reiss and
Rebot Warrants. 83 Thus, the court, in its effort to exercise common sense,
misapplies the Restatement rule to reach a decision that lacks precedential
84
support, and which arguably does not actually reflect the parties' intent.

82. The court concludes that
just as plaintiffs should not suffer from the possibility of dilution of their warrants
resulting from a stock split, so too Financial should not suffer from the consolidation
of its shares resulting from a declaration of a reverse stock split. . . .Any other
conclusion would ignore the plain intent of the parties in issuing and receiving the
subject warrants.
Id. at 33 (citations omitted). Plain intent is apparently a matter of opinion.
83. In any event, plaintiff would not necessarily have had to take a different position in
the event of a stock split; they could have advanced the same position, but simply declined to
purchase the shares whose value was lower than the warrant price.
The concern expressed by the defendants, namely, that plaintiffs will unfairly reap a
"windfall" if their warrants are not deemed to have been automatically altered by
operation of the Corporation's reverse stock split, should not affect the court's
analysis of the situation. While an aversion to applying the precise terms of the
contract under consideration here is at least facially understandable, the law of
contracts offers no relief simply because the contract, as applied, may be unfair. This
windfall could have been avoided by inclusion of standard terms and conditions
referable to the stock warrants, a precaution which, for whatever reason, the
Corporation did not take in this instance.
Id. at 43 (Saxe, J., dissenting in part).
84. Id. at 40 (Saxe, J., dissenting in part).
The majority, employing an analysis grounded in "common sense," reasoned that the
parties "must have" intended for the stock warrants issued to plaintiffs to be altered in
the same proportions as actual shares of stock would be by any stock split occurring
during their effective period. However, resort by a court to its subjective view of
common sense is not a proper basis for a legal conclusion, particularly when it
ignores both plaintiff's assertion of what the parties negotiated and intended, as well
as "[tihe cardinal rule of contract interpretation ... that, where the language of the
contract is clear and unambiguous, the parties' intent is to be gleaned from the
language of the agreement and whatever may be reasonably implied therefrom.
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C. JudicialMisapplicationof the Plain Meaning Rule, Leading to Judicial
Misapplicationof the Restatement Rules
The textual and contextual approaches can co-exist peacefully, if each is
applied correctly. The textual approach becomes inapplicable if the text is
not clear and unambiguous. The court can then bring in extrinsic evidence to
settle the ambiguity. It is a short jump from there to a contextual approach,
taking into account extrinsic evidence without a determination of ambiguity.
But a court that misapplies the plain meaning rule in its textual approach can
then go on to also misapply the Restatement rules, generating a legally
insupportable holding that does not reflect the parties' intent, but instead
reflects what such court thinks the parties' intent should have been.
Like the Reiss trial court, the court in Sanders v. Wang 8 5 incorrectly
applied a textual approach, but the Sanders court did so in order to support
its decision not to supply an adjustment provision when both a pure textual
approach and the Restatement's more flexible plain meaning rule would
support the addition of such a term. Computer Associates International, Inc.
("CA") adopted a Key Employee Stock Option Plan (the "Plan") in 1995,
authorizing the grant of up to six million shares of its common stock to three
key executives, who were also directors. 8 6 The first two million shares were
to be granted outright, upon adoption of the Plan, with additional grants of
up to four million shares contingent upon CA's common stock attaining and
maintaining certain performance levels. 87 These performance levels also
controlled when the shares granted would vest; if the CA stock traded at
88
$180 or more for at least 60 trading days, all six million shares would vest.
The Plan was administered by the Compensation Committee of the
board, which was vested thereunder with "all discretion and authority as it
deems necessary or appropriate to administer the Plan and to interpret the
provisions of the Plan."8 9 Unlike the Reiss and Rebot Warrants, the Plan
85. 25 DEL.I. CoRp. L. 1036 (Del. Ch. 2000).
86. Id. at 1044. The board approved the Plan on May 25, 1995 and the shareholders
approved the Plan at their annual meeting in August 1995. Id.
The participants in the Plan were Chairman and CEO Charles Wang at 60%, President
Sanjay Kumar at 30%, and Executive Vice President Russell Artzt at 10% of the granted
shares. See William M. Bulkeley, Decompensation: Executives Ordered to Return Millions,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1999, at Al. Mr. Wang was the most highly compensated executive of
1995, according to Forbes Magazine's annual pay survey. See Mark Harrington, Wang, the
$650 Million Man, FORBEs, Mar. 21, 2000, at A08.
87. Sanders, 25 DEL.J. CoRp. L. at 1044.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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contemplated the possibility of a recapitalization, providing an approach
(albeit an incomplete one) by which to determine the effect of any such
recapitalization on the Plan. The terms of the Plan gave the Compensation
Committee discretion, when determining whether the requisite performance
levels had been met, to adjust the target stock to account for any stock splits
effected after the adoption of the Plan. However, the Plan did not contain a
corresponding provision authorizing the Compensation Committee to adjust
the number of shares granted to account for any stock split, although this is a
standard provision in such an arrangement. 90 Thus, under the literal terms of
the Plan, the number of shares awarded would remain constant even if the
target stock price per share were reduced by a stock split, or increased by a
reverse stock split. CA subsequently effected three separate three-for-two
stock splits in August 1995, June 1996 and November 1997. 9 1
On May 21, 1998, the Compensation Committee certified that the target
prices had been met, as the CA common stock had traded at $180 or better
for at least 60 trading days in a twelve-month period. The actual share price
was $53.33, which exceeded the $180 threshold when adjusted for the stock
splits. In reliance on its discretion under the Plan, the Compensation
Committee granted the Plan participants a total of 20.25 million shares
worth over $1.08 billion, the equivalent of the six million shares authorized
92
by the literal language of the Plan, adjusted for the stock splits.
Shareholders of CA filed suit against CA's seven directors, including the
three Plan participants, alleging gross negligence, corporate waste, and
breach of fiduciary duties in connection with the grant of shares under the
Plan. 9 3 The Delaware Chancery Court found for the plaintiffs. It refused to
90. Matt Krantz, Computer Associates Execs Must Return $557 M In Stock, USA
TODAY, Dec. 15, 1999, at 3B.
91. Sanders, 25 DEL. J. CoRp. L. at 1045.
92. Id. "Wang and his board inflamed investors by awarding all 20 million shares on
one day, instead of parceling out the stock (and the earnings write-downs) over a period of
years." Anthony Bianco, Software's Tough Guy, Bus. WK., Mar. 6, 2000, at 132.
93. Sanders, 25 DEL. J. CoRP. L. at 1036. CA shareholders filed six separate lawsuits in
the Eastern District of New York and the Delaware Court of Chancery. The suits ultimately
were consolidated after the Eastern District determined that the appropriate forum for the
litigation was the Court of Chancery. See Sanders v. Wang, No. 16640-NC, 2001 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 82, at *4-5 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2001).
The consolidated case involves two plaintiffs from two separate cases: Lisa Sanders and
Edward Bickel. The two plaintiffs agree that defendants granted shares without authority
under the Plan, but disagree on how many such granted shares were unauthorized. Sanders,
DEL. J. CoRP. L. at 1045.
CA granted the shares just before issuing a public warning that its sales were slowing. Its
stock dropped more than 30 per cent and the Plan became a symbol of excessive executive
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read in a provision permitting adjustment of the number of shares available
under the Plan that would correspond with and give effect to the provision in
the Plan permitting the adjustment of the price of the shares. The court
ordered the Plan participants to return 9.5 million of the granted shares, one
of the largest givebacks of executive compensation ever ordered. 94 The
court's decision is meritless, and fails to give effect to the parties' intent.
In reaching its decision, the court applied a textual approach, relying on
the plain meaning rule that when the language is "clear and unequivocal, a
party will be bound by its clear meaning." 9 5 The court relied exclusively on
the text of the Plan, specifically the provision limiting the number of shares
to be granted thereunder to a maximum of six million. This provision is clear
on its face and unambiguous. Thus, the court determined that the Plan was
not ambiguous on its face and therefore should be given effect as written. As
a result, the court declined to give effect to the grant of discretion plainly
96
given to the Compensation Committee in its administration of the Plan.
compensation. See R. S. Shankar, Whose $550 Million is it Anyway,? REDIFF ON THE NET
(Nov. 19, 1999), at http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/nov/19us5.htm (last visited Sept. 15,
2002). See also David Crowe, Court Overturns CA Share Issue, AUSTIN. FIN. REv., Nov. 11,
1000, at 34.
94. See Ariana Eunjung Cha, Billion-Dollar Bonus Cut in Half, Judge Backs
Shareholders,Tells Executives to Repay Stock, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1999, at Al. Mr. Wang
will have to return almost half of the 10 million shares he was granted, worth $696 million;
Mr. Kumar will have to return almost half of the six million shares he got; Mr. Artzt will have
to return almost half of the two million shares he got. See Bulkeley, supra note 86. While
defendants' appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court was pending, the parties settled on the
return of 4.5 million shares. John F. Manser, Computer Associates Executives Settle
Shareholder Suits, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 6, 2000, at 5 (quoting Mr. de Vogel, chairman of CA
board's Compensation Committee). CA issued a statement that "even though it continues to
believe that the original stock awards were in accordance with both the spirit and intent of the
1995 plan, it is in the interests of the company and its shareholders to put this matter behind
us." Id. The company agreed to drop its appeal as part of the settlement. Id.
The judge approved the settlement on June 22, 2000, and agreed to award the
shareholders' lawyers 900,000 shares of CA common to cover their fees and expenses.
Sanders v. Wang and Bickel v. Wang, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 82, at *4 (May 24, 2001). This
award, in turn, generated its own litigation. Id. After the Delaware suit was commenced, a
New York lawyer filed another derivative suit in New York. Id. The New York court
consolidated it with the Delaware action, id. at *4-5, and when the Delaware court approved
the settlement, the New York lawyer filed an application for attorney's fees, id. at *7.The
judge denied the application, finding that the lawyer's actions "did not contribute in any
meaningful way to the efforts of the plaintiffs to create a benefit for the shareholders of
Computer Associates or the corporation itself." Id. at *2.
95. Sanders,25 DEL. J. CoRp.L. at 1051-52 (citation omitted).
96. See id. at 1050-52. "Contract interpretation starts with the terms of the contract. If
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The court held that the Plan's failure to specifically provide a corresponding
adjustment to the number of shares granted in the event of a stock split was
subject to the restrictive plain meaning rule. 9 7 The court's view completely
overlooks the intent of parties evidenced by the inclusion of a provision that
explicitly permits the Compensation Committee to adjust the performance
targets to reflect any stock splits. This is a glaring example of the limitations
inherent in the plain meaning rule, and the need for judicial adoption of the
more flexible Restatement version that adds the caveat "unless a different
98
intention is manifested."
Whether the corresponding adjustment language for the number of
shares after a stock split was omitted intentionally from the Plan is
unclear. 99 What is clear is that the Plan gives the Compensation Committee
broad discretion to administer and interpret the Plan, and so the Committee
was entitled to supply such a provision. The court focused exclusively on the
text of the Plan, relying on precedent for its position that any inquiry "into
the subjective unexpressed intent or understanding of the individual parties
[to the contract] is neither necessary nor appropriate where words of the
contract are sufficiently clear to prevent reasonable persons from
the terms are plain on their face, then the analysis stops there." Id. at 1050 (citation omitted).
The court finds that the Plan "could not be more clear in limiting the total share grant under
the Plan. While §6.2 gives the board authority to interpret and administer the Plan, I can not
find that the board could reasonably ignore a clear six million share limit in order to
authorized an award of 20.25 million shares." Id. at 1052.
97. Id. at 1051. The court finds that the terms of the Plan "are not susceptible to varying
interpretations under any reasonable analysis that could lead to the conclusion that the board
had the authority to award excess shares over the limitation found in [the Plan]." Id.
98. RESTATeENT (SEcoND) OFCONrACTS § 202(3) (1981).
99. The plaintiffs' position was that because CA had included such a provision in at
least four other compensation plans written before and after this one, the exclusion must have
been intentional. See Ron Insana, Computer Associates' Top Three Executives Ordered To
Pay Back $1/2 Billion In Lawsuit Over Bonuses And Executive Stock Holdings, CNBC News
Transcript of "Business Center," Nov. 9, 1999.
One must recognize that the board had every opportunity and the ability to insert a
similar provision in this KESOP. Past practice showed that where the board wanted
such authority and the shareholders have been asked to grant it, that after being fully
informed of the consequences, they have approved similar provisions.
Sanders, 25 DEL J. CoRp. L. at 1055.
The defendants disagreed, claiming that "[tihe most fair and logical reading of the plan
requires adjusting the number of shares to be awarded to account for any stock splits,"
according to Willem F.P. de Vogel, a Computer Associates board member and chair of the
Compensation Committee. "That is what we intended." David Ward, Computer Associates to
Appeal Executive Stock Return Ruling, BLOOMBERG NEws, Nov. 10, 1999.
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disagreeing as to their meaning." 10 0 While this may be true, in this instance
reasonable people could certainly disagree as to the meaning of the Plan.
Despite the court's statement that the "primary goal of contract
interpretation is to satisfy the reasonable expectations of the parties at the
time they entered into the contract," the court ignored the evidence of the
parties' reasonable expectations presented by the language of the Plan itself.
101 A likely rationale underlying the adoption of the Plan would be to give
the Plan participants an incentive to remain at CA by rewarding them for
10 2
achieving designated improvements in the common stock price.
Presumably, the Plan would inspire them to increase the value of the
enterprise as a whole, as reflected in the stock price, and not just to increase
the per share stock price alone. Were this not the case, the Plan participants
could have attempted to effect a reverse stock split that would have
increased the value of each share, presumably causing the stock to hit the
market price triggers, without any change in the actual value of the
company. Under this court's analysis, that would have been consistent with
the parties' intent as evidenced only by the text of the Plan, although
arguably, it is not what the Plan was designed to accomplish.
Had the parties intended the unusual drafting choice to include a
provision in the Plan adjusting the price target to take into account any
future stock splits, and yet to exclude a corresponding provision adjusting
the number of shares, the prudent course would have been to express this in
the text of their agreement. An explicit provision to this effect would have
permitted a court using the plain meaning rule to enforce the odd result that
the value promised under the Plan could be increased or decreased at will, if
CA undertook a stock split or reverse split. It is noteworthy, in this context,
that the Plan participants constituted three out of seven board members, just
100. Sanders, 25 Da-. J. CORP. L. at 1051 (quoting Demetree v. Commonwealth Trust
Co., Del. Ch., C.A. No. 14354, slip op. at 7-8 (1997)).
101. Id. at 1050 (citation omitted).
102. See Anthony Bianco, The Package That Launched a Dozen Lawsuits, Bus. WK.,
Apr. 17, 2000, at 108 ("To qualify for the shares under a plan approved by CA shareholders in
1995, top managers were given five years to lift the stock price from $20 to $53.33. They did
it in three, to de Vogel's surprise.... To cover the cost of the grant, CA took a staggering
$675 million charge against earnings. After the write off, CA's stock dropped into the 20s but
has rebounded strongly of late, to the $55 range.").
According to Willem F. P. de Vogel, the chairman of the Compensation Committee, "the
plan was designed to retain key executives whose performance is outstanding.... [t]he plan
was triggered by a $17.4 billion increase in the market value of CA measured by specific
performance milestones, and that the reward would be equal to 3.75 per cent of its equity."
Shankar, supra note 93.
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one director short of a majority. In the absence of evidence in the text of the
Plan that this was a deliberate drafting choice by the parties, the court's
03
attempted application of a textual approach lacks merit. 1
According to the court, "Interpreting the [P]lan in order to administer it
properly is one thing, fundamentally altering its substantive terms is quite
another." 104 But the principles of contract interpretation may require a court
to do just that, to give effect to the intention of the parties. When a company
gives someone the right to buy stock, there is an extrinsically determinable
value to that right, made up of two components-the number of shares and
the value of the shares. In the event of a recapitalization, the right should
either adjust completely, or not adjust, depending on the parties' intent. But
it is illogical to think the parties would intend just one of these components
to adjust, as if in a vacuum. Here, the parties demonstrated their intent that
the right should adjust. To preserve the relative value of the right, both the
number and stock price need to be adjusted in parallel in the event of any
change in the underlying capitalization. The Plan permitted adjustment of
the target share price that triggered the grants, but failed to provide a
corresponding adjustment to the number of shares to be granted. 10 5 This
omission is capable of correction under the terms of the Plan itself. The
broad discretion given to the Compensation Committee to administer and
interpret the Plan permits the Committee to add the missing provision.
The court's application of the plain meaning rule in this case results in a
decision that frustrates the parties' intent and instead gives effect to the
court's view of what that intent should have been, perhaps reflecting an
inherent bias arising out of the enormous sum of money involved. 106 In any
103. Defendants issued a statement in response to the ruling: "'Such a decision runs
counter to the reasonable expectations that all parties had when the plan was approved by
shareholders."' Insana, supra note 99 (quoting CA's issued statement).
104.

Sanders, 25 DEL. J. CoRP. L. at 1055.

105. Id. at 1047.
The strict reading of the share limitation provision frustrates the purpose of the Plan
and penalizes its recipients. In particular, defendants say that plaintiffs' strict reading
does not make economic sense because if, instead of stock splits, there had been a
"reverse stock split" or a share consolidation, then the defendant Participants would
get twice as much equity, or over $2 billion ....
[If this were actually the case that
the plaintiffs would then not support their own proposition that a strict reading is
required, and would in fact argue just the opposite."
Id.
106. Id. at 1052.
As a practical matter, rough calculations indicate that even under the strictest reading
of the Plan, the three Participants will together still receive nearly $320 million. $320
million is no mere bagatelle. I find it remarkable that the defendants would have me
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event, had the court applied a more systematic contextual approach, such as
the one used by the New York Court of Appeals in Reiss, the result would
have been a decision that would be supportable as a matter of law and that
would give effect to the likely intent of the parties. 10 7 The contextual
approach suggested by the Restatement requires that interpretation of the
parties' written agreement be directed to the meaning of the writing, "in light
of the circumstances." The circumstances surrounding the Plan show that the
parties considered the possible effect of a stock split on the Plan, and made
an effort to preserve the grant of the value given thereunder through the
adjustment provision and the grant of discretion to the Compensation
Committee. A contextual approach to interpreting the Plan would result in
the conclusion that the Committee was authorized to make a corresponding
adjustment to the number of shares granted after the three stock splits.
The grant of discretion under the terms of the Plan itself furnishes a
basis for the addition of the missing adjustment provision. The Restatement
provision on omitted terms does not support the addition of an adjustment
provision in this case. Under the Restatement, an omitted term cannot be
added simply to give effect to the judge's determination of the parties'
intent. Rather, courts are permitted to add only essential terms necessary to
effectuate the contract. The adjustment term for the number of shares
granted under the Plan is not an omitted essential term under the
Restatement, as the Plan could be enforced solely based on its terms by
limiting the shares available to the literal terms of the Plan. However, the
terms of the Plan clearly indicate the parties' intent that the shares granted
thereunder should retain their value, and provide textual support for adding
the missing term through the grant of discretion to the Compensation
Committee. Thus the Court's decision not to supply such a provision gives
effect to its own view of what the parties' intent was, and not the actual
demonstrated intent of the parties.

believe that CA's shareholders would consider that $320 million for three individuals
failed to 'encourage, recognize, and reward sustained outstanding individual
performance by certain key employees.'
Id. at 1052; see also Mark I. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 21-22 (2000) (discussing judicial review of executive
compensation).
107. See Part III. infra for a discussion of the New York Court of Appeals' decision in
Reiss v. FinancialPerformance Corp., 715 N.Y.S.2d 29 (2000).
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D. The Dangersof JudicialMisapplicationof the Principlesof Contract
Interpretation
The trial court and appellate division decisions in Reiss and the decision
in Sanders illustrate how a court's approach to contract interpretation can
result in a legally insupportable holding that does not reflect the parties'
intent, and instead reflects what such court thinks the parties' intent should
have been. The holding in Cofman v. Acton Corp. 10 8 illustrates the
additional risks of inappropriate or incorrect applications of principles of
contract interpretation. This insupportable holding compounds its unsound
legal reasoning by creating dangerous precedent, relied on by the Appellate
Division in Reiss. 109
In Cofman, plaintiffs entered into settlement agreements with defendant
Acton Corporation, providing each plaintiff with a set sum of money plus an
added "sweetener" payable upon demand within the three years following
the execution of the settlement agreements. 1 10 The settlement agreements
did not contain anti-dilution provisions. I II The "sweetener" was a one-time
payment equal to the average closing price of one share of Acton's common
stock on the American Stock Exchange for any period of 30 consecutive
trading days prior to the exercise date selected by plaintiffs, less an exercise
price of $7.00.112 Acton's stock price around the time the settlement
1 13
agreements were executed fluctuated from $1.50 to $3.12 per share.
About a year after the settlement agreements were signed, the price of
Acton's common stock rose, not because of any change in the financial
1 14
situation at Acton, but as a result of a one-for-five reverse stock split.
Plaintiffs each made written demand on Acton, seeking the sweetener based
on the share price after the reverse stock split of $20.54.115 Acton sought
108.
109.
110.
"sweetener"

958 F.2d 494 (1st Cir. 1992).
Reiss, 715 N.Y.S. 2d at 33.
Cofman, 958 F.2d at 495. In a somewhat ironic twist, Acton included this
to avoid issuing stock warrants because "Acton did not wish this complication."

Id.
111.
Cofman v. Acton Corp., 768 F. Supp. 392, 395-96 (D. Mass. 1991) ("Whatever
may have been the reasons for the parties' failure to address stock splits and reverse stock
splits, the fact that they did fail to do so is manifest. Not a single word or phrase explicitly
about stock splits or reverse stock splits appears anywhere in the Agreements.").
112. Cofman, 958 F.2d at 495.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 496. The court notes that the reverse stock split was undertaken because
Acton "concluded that there were psychological market advantages in artificially shrinking the
number of outstanding shares, and thereby increasing the per share price." id.
115. Cofinan, 768 F. Supp. at 393.
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judicial confirmation that the exercise price of $7.00 stated in the settlement
agreements somehow automatically adjusted upwards by a factor of five
because of the reverse stock split. 116 The corporation bolstered its
contention with a letter to plaintiffs to such effect. 1 17 Like the defendants in
Reiss, Acton apparently believed it could bind its counterparts to new
contractual provisions simply by sending them a letter stating those
provisions.
The district court took it upon itself to supply an adjustment provision to
the exercise price, and held for Acton. In a misguided effort at consistency,
it tried to protect the parties from their careless and incomplete drafting. It
determined that it would have been reasonable for stock splits to have no
effect, so it held that the price of a share of stock was deemed to mean the
form of a share at the time the agreement was signed. 118 Thus, the district
court held the settlement agreement had to be modified to reflect the reverse
stock split. 119
116. Id. at 394. "Partnerships' position is simple and straightforward. This is precisely
the way the agreement reads; it is unambiguous, and integrated, and even were parol evidence
admissible, which they deny, there was no prior discussion suggesting exceptions." Cofman,
958 F.2d at 496 (footnote omitted). Defendant claims that the share of common stock referred
to in the agreements
plainly means the form of common stock in existence when the Agreements were
signed. Since that form of common stock is no longer in existence, the argument
goes, one share of today's stock must be viewed as equivalent to five old shares.
Defendants argue that, in determining defendants' payment obligation under Section
2.2, the trigger price must be adjusted from $7.00 to $35.00.
Cofinan, 768 F. Supp. at 394.
117. Cofinan, 958 F.2d at 496.
This is to advise you that the stockholders of Acton Corporation have authorized a
one-for-five reverse stock split of Acton Corporation's common shares ....
The
reverse stock split will affect Section 2.2 of the above-referenced Agreement such
that the price $7.00 as referenced in such Section shall become $35.00.
Id.
118. Cofinan, 768 F. Supp. at 394.
119. Id.
Expressed another way, the substantive effect of the position the defendants took, and
now take, is that the trigger price remains $7.00 and the price to compare it is onefifth of the May 1989 price of Acton stock, because of the five-for-one combination
that occurred after the trigger price was set.
Id.
In searching for the parties' manifested meaning a court is both guided and
constrained by the form, structure, sense, and internally manifested design of the
contract itself--the mutual expression of the parties. The answer the decisionmaker is
seeking is not the answer the decisionmaker would think best if left entire freedom of
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The district court's holding is without basis under either a textual or
contextual approach. Under the plain meaning rule, the unambiguous text is
the exclusive source from which the court can ascertain the parties' original
intent. Here, the settlement agreements clearly and unambiguously provide
no adjustment mechanism. The district court demonstrated its
misunderstanding of the plain meaning rule by finding that "the language
' 12 0
used by the parties does not explicitly address the question at issue."
Under a correct application of the plain meaning rule, this fact would be
dispositive. The clear and unambiguous language of the settlement
agreements should be given effect. Under the plain meaning rule, the district
court is not permitted to consider any extrinsic evidence, or to add in another
term that it thinks reflects the parties' intent.
Likewise, a purely contextual approach applying the Restatement rules
does not support the addition of an adjustment provision. The Restatement
permits a court to add only "essential" terms. 12 1 Because the settlement
agreements could be enforced solely based on their terms, with the stated
exercise price of $7.00, the adjustment term added by the district court is not
"essential" under the Restatement.
Even though its decision is not supportable under any approach to
contract interpretation, correctly applied, the district court struggled mightily
to fit its decision to violate freedom of contract into some framework of
legally supportable analysis. The district court makes new law, finding that
"when a document contains no internal indicia that the parties manifested an
agreement with each other about an issue, we may need to do some reality
testing of litigation positions." 12 2 Thus it decides to "wash each party's
current contention about meaning in 'cynical acid."' 123 As part of this
"wash," the district court considers how each party's assertion would have
fared during the negotiation of the settlement agreements. The problem with
this line of conjecture, aside from the fact that it is the merest of conjecture,
is an inherent logical problem. 124 It seems unlikely that the parties would
choice. It is fundamental to the integrity of the decisionmaking process that the
decisionmaker accept both the guidance and the constraints to be found in the parties'
own mutual expression of their agreement.
Id. at 396.
120. Id. at 395.
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (1981).
122. Cofinan, 768 F. Supp. at 396.
123. Id.
124. "Plaintiff also argues that the defendants accepted the risk of such a reverse stock
split by not insisting upon or even negotiating for an antidilution clause in the body of the
Agreements." Id. at 394.
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bandy about the possibility of a stock split, or a reverse stock split, pose their
irreconcilable views and then decide the prudent course would be to leave
the agreement silent on the issue, subject to judicial interpretation at some
later date. A more appropriate approach would have been for the district
court to correctly apply the binding precedents of contract interpretation,
such as the plain meaning rule, saving the acid of its cynicism for a different
application.
The First Circuit affirmed the district court decision, noting the
"fundamental principle that a contract is to be construed as meaningful and
not illusory." 125 Nonetheless, the court based its decision on what might
have happened had Acton effectuated a stock split, instead of a reverse stock
split. 12 6 In such a case, the value of each share of stock would have
decreased by a factor equal to the number of shares into which each share of
common stock was split. Absent some remarkable gains on the part of Acton
unconnected to the recapitalization, a likely result of such a stock split
would be that the $7.00 exercise price would exceed the price of the
common stock, and the sweetener would be valueless to the plaintiffs. 1 27
Because this scenario did not occur, it was not an appropriate area for
12 8
inquiry by the court.
The court permitted the proverbial tail to wag the actual dog by relying
on this wholly irrelevant scenario, finding that "it defies common sense" that
plaintiffs would have willingly entered into an arrangement with this
possible outcome. 129 There is a fundamental difference between construing
a contract in a consistent manner and construing a contract in a reciprocal
125. Cofinan, 958 F.2d at 497.
126. Id.
127. "'It defies common sense' that [the] Partnerships would have agreed that Acton
could effectively escape the specified consequences of a rising market price by increasing the
number of shares. And if the Partnerships would not suffer from any increasing, it would
follow, since a contract must be construed consistently, Acton should not suffer from any
decreasing." Id. (citations omitted).
128. This approach created an unsound precedent relied on by the appellate division in
Reiss. According to the New York Court of Appeals in Reiss, the appellate division used
Cofinan to reason that "in the event of a forward stock split, supplying a term providing for
the proportionate adjustment of the number of shares that could be purchased, and the
exercise price, would be necessary to save the warrant holders from having the value of their
warrants "eviscerated." Reiss v. Fin. Performance Corp., 764 N.E.2d 958, 962 (N.Y. 2001).
According to the New York Court of Appeals, the appellate division took a second step
and reasoned that "just as plaintiffs should not suffer from the possibility of dilution of their
warrants resulting from a stock split, so too Financial should not suffer from the consolidation
of its shares resulting from a declaration of a reverse stock split." Reiss, 764 N.E.2d at 963.
129. Cofiman, 958 F.2d at 497.
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manner. Every contract right and duty need not be fully consistent with its
inverse, and the principles of contract interpretation do not require that they
be so. Nonetheless, the court observed that the plaintiffs entered into the
settlement agreement to capture the possibility of additional funds if Acton's
business improved. While this may be true, as a matter of law such a
conclusion has no bearing on the interpretation of the provisions of the
settlement agreements actually agreed to by the parties.
That the court was reaching for a result is evidenced by its justification
"[w]hether we reach that result by implying a provision to meet a
circumstance not envisaged by the parties, or by construing the word "share"
as including following the res, is immaterial."' 1 30 The court applied the
Restatement rule incorrectly, finding this to be "precisely a case where to
read the contract as meaning that Partnerships should not suffer by
dilution-and hence Acton by reverse dilution-is a necessity, or 'essential
to a determination."' 131 The court's misunderstanding of how the
Restatement rule works is evidenced by its finding that "[t]here is every
reason to presume Partnerships did not intend to acquire nothing, and saving
from unenforceability ranks as a necessity." 13 2 Such a subjective
determination undermines the very foundations of contract interpretation and
creates unsound precedent. This is not an appropriate application of the
Restatement rule. The Restatement permits the addition of those terms that
are "essential." The settlement agreements are capable of being construed
without the addition of an anti-dilution clause. That means the plaintiffs get
a windfall. And that is the risk created by poor draftsmanship.
III. CONSISTENT AND CORRECT APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT
INTERPRETATION LEADING TO SOUND PRECEDENT

Just as the misapplication of the principles of contract interpretation can
create bad precedents, the consistent and careful application of these same
principles can create sound precedent, and can provide courts with an
approach that will generate consistent outcomes more likely to reflect the
contracting parties' original intent.
The New York Court of Appeals provided just such a sound precedent in
its recent decision in Reiss. The court adopted a more systematic contextual
approach to interpreting the warrants, and modified the appellate division
decision to reinstate the cause of action seeking a declaration that plaintiffs
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id.

Id.
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were entitled to exercise the Reiss and Rebot Warrants in accordance with
their literal terms.1 33 Under its approach, the court started its analysis with
the text of the warrants-the actual words that the parties chose. The
warrant certificates represented the sum total of their agreement, and the
certificates did not provide for anti-dilution. Since the text proved
insufficient to ascertain the parties' intent, the court then put the warrants in
their context. If the litigating parties do not share the same intent, as in this
case, the court must make a determination as to which version of their intent
34
should prevail. 1
As a result of this analysis, the court determined that the parties' intent
was not mutual or readily ascertainable and that the parties' respective
intents were, in fact, at odds with each other. Mr. Reiss claimed the lack of
anti-dilution protection was intentional, as a response to his objections to
signing warrant agreements with such provisions. Financial claimed the antidilution provision was unintentionally omitted. The court noted that one
month prior to the issuance of the Reiss and Rebot Warrants, Financial
issued a warrant certificate to Robert Trump, along with a warrant
agreement containing anti-dilution provisions. Mr. Reiss and Financial could
have included a similar provision in their arrangement but did not do so, for
whatever reason. 13 5 The court systematically applied the relevant principles
133. The New York Court of Appeals found these warrants enforceable according to
their terms because they have "all the material provisions necessary to make them enforceable
contracts, including number of shares, price, and expiration date, and were drafted by
sophisticated and counseled business persons." Reiss, 764 N.E.2d at 960.
134. It is a fiction to think the court can easily discern and give effect to the parties'
intent. If their intent were so mutual and clear that a court could ascertain it, it would likely be
reflected in the agreement, obviating the need for judicial determination.
135. However, this inaction may have been unintentional. Whoever drafted the warrant
certificates may have simply overlooked the need for such a provision. According to
Financial, Alan Swiedler, its counsel, was supposed to prepare Warrant Agreements to control
the terms and conditions of all 10 warrants issued by Financial in 1993, but failed to do so.
See Record on Appeal, supra note 51, at 101. When Financial subsequently fired the lawyer in
April 1994, he retained certain papers he was preparing for Financial until they came to a
settlement amongst themselves in February 1995. Reiss, 715 N.Y.S.2d at 38 (Saxe, J.,
dissenting in part). Under the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement entered into between
Financial and Mr. Swiedler, upon payment of the agreed upon sums, Mr. Swiedler agreed to
return all the books and records and other documents of Financial, and Mr. Swiedler withdrew
his challenge of the validity of the 1994 proxy and annual meeting. See Stipulation of
Settlement, Index No. 113927/94, dated Oct. 3, 1994 (on file with author).
While there is no direct evidence that warrant agreements to accompany the Reiss and
Rebot Warrants were part of those papers, Financial alludes to at least the possibility. Reiss,
715 N.Y.S.2d at 38 (Saxe, J., dissenting in part). Financial's new lawyer reviewed the papers
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of contract interpretation, finding evidence in the record that the parties may
have intentionally omitted an anti-dilution provision. 13 6 It seems unlikely
that, during the parties' negotiation, they agreed to intentionally omit an
anti-dilution term, putting the risk of a stock split on Mr. Reiss, and the risk
of a reverse stock split on Financial. This would seem especially unlikely on
the part of Financial, which included such a provision in its arrangements
with Mr. Trump. But since the court found that the circumstances
surrounding the formation of the warrants indicated that the parties must
have foreseen the contingency when the contract was made, and because the
warrants can be enforced according to their terms, the court declined to add
an adjustment term. 137 The court remanded the case for a calculation of
damages.

138

for all 10 of the warrants issued by Financial in 1993 including the Trump, Reiss and Rebot
warrants, and asserted in a letter of June 20, 1995 that he discovered his predecessor had
"failed to prepare and submit to the Board of Directors for approval any form of warrant
agreement pursuant to which the warrant certificates were to have been issued." Reiss, 715
N.Y.S.2d at 38 (Saxe, J., dissenting in part).
136. According to the plaintiffs' brief:
The Record discloses that during the course of the negotiations, plaintiff Reiss,
individually and on behalf of plaintiff Rebot, would not and did not consent to
accepting warrants that were subject to the terms of a warrant agreement, such as the
agreement the Corporation made with another investor, Robert Trump, only one
month earlier.
Brieffor Plaintiff-Appellants, dated May 2, 2001; Record on Appeal, supra note 51, at 140141. But it seems unlikely that the parties discussed the possibility of recapitalization and
intentionally left the matter unresolved. Financial likely assumed its counsel had put antidilution provisions in warrant agreements covering the Reiss and Rebot Warrants. Reiss likely
assumed that since Financial was in such desperate financial shape, they might agree to give
him the upside on any reverse split later on
137. Reiss, 764 N.E.2d at 961.
[Tihis Court will not imply a term where the circumstances surrounding the
formation of the contract indicate that the parties when the contract was made, must
have foreseen the contingency at issue and the agreement can be enforced according
to its terms.... Even where a contingency has been omitted, we will not necessarily
imply a term since 'courts may not by construction add or excise terms, nor distort
the meaning of those used.'
Id.
138. See supra note 67 for a discussion of Mr. Reiss' damages claim.
The plaintiffs did not revive the reformation claim, since even if it were to be granted, it
would still leave them with now-expired warrants. Reiss, 764 N.E.2d at 962. "Rather, they
have argued that their attempt to exercise the warrants, together with their motion for an order
to show cause, preserved their right to exercise all the warrants upon the successful conclusion
of the litigation." Id. The Court punts, stating: "If [the] Supreme Court determines that
plaintiffs are entitled to the declaration they seek on the reinstated cause of action, the Court
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While the New York Court of Appeals' decision may send shivers up
the spine of anyone who drafts options or warrants, the decision is the only
possible legally-supportable outcome. The court correctly applied the
relevant precedents to reach an appropriate conclusion as a matter of law.
The first reaction upon hearing the facts of Reiss might be to want the court
to read in an adjustment provision to preserve the parties' agreement. But
courts need to be very careful in adding provisions, limiting such additions
to those terms that are truly essential to a determination of the parties' rights
and duties. In Reiss, the missing adjustment term was not essential and the
court reached the correct, albeit potentially unpopular, decision.
IV. CONCLUSION

The uneven and unpredictable application of the principles of contract
interpretation is, to some degree, a function of the very nature of the process
of interpretation-and the Anglo-American judicial system's quest for
objectivity. The principles of contract interpretation were designed to be
objective, so that if a particular case fell within an articulated principle, the
principle would be applied, leading to an unbiased determination. But pure
objectivity is a fallacy, since even the application of an objective principle
has some subjective component, as a judge must make the subjective
decision to apply that particular objective principle to that particular case. 13 9

should also resolve the remaining remedial issues, including the effect of the plaintiffs'
tender." Id.
139. For example, a determination that extrinsic evidence should be admitted under
the parol evidence rule requires a determination that the contract is not complete on its face,
which on its own may require the parties to resort to extrinsic evidence to make such a
determination.
Unfortunately, however, parties must communicate express terms through the
inherently imperfect mediation of words, actions, and other manifestations that admit
of varying interpretations. As arbiter of disputed interpretations, the state determines
the meaning of whatever signals the parties exchange. While the state presumably
knows what it means by the formulations it implies into every contract, it does not
know the intended meaning of terms chosen by the parties. Thus, privately formulated
express terms are always subject to an additional dimension of interpretation error.
Goetz & Scott, supra note 6, at 283.
According to Professor Perillo:
There is no single subjective or objective theory. Rather, there are a variety of
different vantage points from which the formation and interpretation of contracts
could conceivably be judged. The legal system could look solely to the intention of
the party who used the words or other signs in question, or solely to the
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Because of the inherent subjectivity embedded in the interpretive
process, neither a purely textual nor a purely contextual approach is likely to
generate objective, determinations of the parties' intent. 14 0 The textual
approach presupposes the unlikely circumstance that the parties have
actually chosen words that both reflect their true intent and are also capable
of only one objective, patently-clear-to-all-who-read-them meaning. The
more likely scenario is that the meaning of the chosen words cannot be
determined without reference to their context. 14 1 The contextual approach
has a more obvious subjective component, allowing the judge to interpret the
circumstances she feels are significant, substituting her views for the views
of the parties.
Courts should acknowledge the specter of subjectivity, yet correctly
apply the principles of contract interpretation as objectively as possible to
give effect to the parties' intent and not the judge's view of what that intent
should have been. To this end, judges should examine the parties' word
choice as a good indicator of their intent. In the likely event such language is
insufficient to resolve all interpretational issues, courts should then examine
the circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract, applying the
objective principles of contract interpretation, including the Restatement
rules, systematically and correctly. 14 2 Courts must understand under what
circumstances each principle is triggered, and the ramifications thereof. The
judge should put herself in the circumstances faced by the parties in order to
render the decision the parties themselves most likely intended to make, not
the decision she herself would have made.
understanding of the party to whom those words or signs were directed. Each of these
vantage points is purely subjective; only the subject changes.
Perillo, supra note 5, at 429.
140. "The purposes of contract interpretation, properly conceived, are neither to
determine a fixed, objective meaning of a written agreement nor to ascertain the true
subjective understanding of individual contracting parties." Goetz & Scott, supra note 6, at
308.
141. Kniffin, supra note 22, at 644.
142. We can borrow a page from the academic discourse on judicial interpretation of
treaties, which poses three basic philosophies: a "textual" approach that emphasizes the plain
meaning of the terms of the treaty; a "limited textual approach" that gives precedence to the
terms of the treaty but permits extrinsic evidence to be considered; and a "policy oriented and
configurative" approach, which seeks to discern and give effect to the intention of the parties,
wherever such intention may be found. See Philip R. Principe, Secret Codes, Military
Hospitals, and The Law Of Armed Conflict: Could Military Medical Facilities' Use of
Encrypted Communications Subject Them to Attack Under International Law? 24 U. ARK.
LrrrLE RocK L. REv. 727, 740 n.79 (2002).
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A court should consider extrinsic evidence in evaluating whether a term
is ambiguous. And when considering missing "essential" terms, courts
should evaluate whether the term is "essential" on as objective a basis as
possible. The purpose of adding a term under the Restatement is to permit a
determination of the parties' rights and duties under the contract. The test
for adding a term should be whether a contract is objectively capable of
being performed without the addition of such term. If the parties can perform
the contract without the term, the term is by definition not essential to a
determination of their rights and duties. This is so even if the court thinks
the added term makes common sense.
The Restatement implicitly supports such an approach, assigning a
different purpose to the addition of a term than to the interpretation of a
contract. An omitted term cannot be added simply to give effect to the
judge's determination of the parties' intent. An essential term under the
Restatement rule therefore is one that is necessary to give effect to the
contract. The reasonableness of the added term should take into account the
qualitative difference between parties with an expectation regarding the
contingency and those with no such expectation. Once the court has
determined whether the parties had such an expectation, such determination
should be a factor in allocating the risk of such contingency. Parties who
have expectations about a contingency but fail to provide for it in their
written contract should be held to have assumed more of the risk of the
absence of such term.
Cases like Reiss, Sanders and Cofinan provide a number of lessons, both
practical and conceptual. On a practical level, drafters of option and warrant
agreements should be mindful of possible future recapitalizations. Standard
provisions in the relevant agreements can render any such recapitalization
merely a change in form and not of substance. Also, when a corporation
considers a recapitalization, the appropriate parties should examine any
outstanding rights to acquire the affected capital stock and determine the
effect of such recapitalization on those rights. The corporation can seek to
renegotiate with the holders to avoid any results unfavorable to the
corporation, restructure the transaction to avoid such results or abandon the
recapitalization and pursue other approaches to achieve the corporation's
goal in undertaking the proposed recapitalization in the first place. 143
143. Steven H. Sholk, Recent Decision of New York Court of Appeals Shows
Importance
of
Proper
Drafting
on
Corporate
Agreements,
at
http://www.gibbonslaw.compublications/articleuser2.cfmpubid=713 (last visited Sept. 15,
2002).
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On a conceptual level, the cases illustrate the risk of inappropriate or
incorrect contract interpretation by the courts. Regardless of whether a court
adopts a textual approach or follows the trend towards a more contextual
approach, inappropriate judicial interpretation threatens to redefine the very
nature of the bargain. 14 4 Courts will, one hopes, adopt the approach used by
the New York Court of Appeals in Reiss, which examined the text and
context of the contract at issue, and then systematically and correctly applied
the appropriate principles of contract interpretation to reach the
precedentially-sound result of declining to read in an adjustment
provision. 14 5 This decision is no doubt unpalatable to the defendant issuer
and its counsel who drafted the warrants in question. 14 6 To the extent such
results do not comport with some societal notion of common sense, the
remedy is to change the underlying principles, and unless and until that
happens, to draft contracts more carefully so that the wording reflects the
parties' true intent. While the goal of an objective determination of the
parties' original intent is not truly feasible, a more systematic contextual
approach to contract interpretation will go a long way to alleviating some of
the inconsistencies rampant in our current system. 147

144. Goetz & Scott, supra note 6, at 272.
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 204 (1981).
146. The drafters had additional grounds for concern arising from the doctrine of
contra proferentuem. Under the Restatement, when choosing among the "reasonable
meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred
which operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise
proceeds." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206. The theory behind this rule is that
when a party selects the terms of a contract, she is more likely to protect her own interests
rather than the interests of her counterpart. Id. § 206 cmt. a. While not limited to these
situations, this principle of interpretation is frequently applied in cases of standardized
contracts, or where one party has a stronger bargaining position. Id. The principle was not
relied on by the courts in Reiss, Sanders or Cofman and, therefore, a detailed discussion is
beyond the scope of this article.
147.
Kniffin, supra note 22, at 662.

